This paper extends the theoretical analysis of the effects of innovation diffusion subsidies. Assuming that: (i) the seller cannot precommit to future sale prices, (ii) buyers have rational expectations, (iii) the subsidies may change over time and (iv) adoption levels remain below the efficient ones, it is shown that subsidies may decrease social welfare. Furthermore, when a percentage of the sale price is subsidized both the rhythm and final extent of diffusion may be reduced and the surplus of the innovation adopters may diminish. These results are specially relevant for diffusion policies as governments do not usually have information about the demand for the innovation and/or the new technology's production costs. The paper also shows that a public agency with complete information may achieve a given welfare level in a cheaper way by using fixed quantity subsidies rather than subsidy rates.
Introduction
The socio-economic effects of innovations take place, mainly, when those innovations are adopted by firms or consumers. The rhythm and extension of an innovation diffusion in the economy determine its impact in terms of employment, competitiveness, production and social welfare. This is why innovation diffusion policies exist in many countries.' However, no detailed analysis on the adequacy of these policies has been undertaken in the literature. For instance, we observe diffusion policies in many countries and, generally, the government is not informed about demand and/or production costs. What are the effects of diffusion policies in this context? The work that follows tries to answer this question and establishes a framework for the study of other neglected aspects.
We consider, in a two-period framework, an innovation demanded by many price taking buyers and produced by a monopolist that cannot establish a credible commitment on his future behaviour. The approach followed in this paper assumes that the innovation adopters have rational expectations and are, therefore, able to reproduce the seller decision problem. Hence, to determine the producer's decision we proceed by backward induction (i.e., we look for a subgame perfect equilibrium) accepting that as in the last period the monopolist maximizes profits he will take into account this behaviour in the initial period. The paper, thus, combines a seller that cannot precommit to future sale prices with buyers that have perfect foresight. The case of sellers that cannot precommit is absent in the previous literature on the effects of diffusion policies and has important consequences for the analysis of those policies.
In this context we analyze the impact of innovation diffusion subsidies (in general, financial incentives). Two kinds of subsidies are considered: fixed quantity subsidies and subsidization of a percentage of the adoption price. We allow the level of the subsidy or the subsidy rate to change over time.
The theoretical literature that analyzes the effects of subsidies on the adoption of innovations is limited. Stoneman and David's (1986) and Stoneman (1987a) and David (1986, p. 147 ) stated: ' . . . The point we can make is that a monopolist supplier will not act passively when the government intervenes. The monopolist's reactions in pursuing maximum profits in the light of government policy may well counteract the intent of that policy'. This paper shows how subsidies may reduce social welfare (defined as the present value of the sum of consumer surplus and the producer's surplus net of subsidies cost) and how, in the case of subsidy rates, they may even make diffusion lower in both periods and reduce the surplus of the innovation adopters. That reduction in welfare occurs even if adoption levels remain below those (efficient) levels that maximize social welfare. In fact, we center our attention on the case of adoption levels that remain below the efficient ones to emphasize this result and to capture many real situations where the budget available to promote adoption would not suffice to attain the efficient levels.
These results follow as a consequence of the combination of three issues:
The above mentioned monopolist's reaction to subsidies. We show that the seller reacts with a higher increase in prices to subsidy rates than to comparable fixed quantity subsidies. The reason is that with subsidy rates an increase in the sale price automatically implies an increase in the amount of the subsidy given to the adopter and, therefore, has a lower impact on the quantity demanded.
(ii) Subsidies, which are considered a cost for society, are borne neither by the seller nor by the buyers of the innovation, as is usually the case in reality.
(iii) Subsidies may change, in their level or rate, over time. The consideration of non constant subsidies affects the decisions of the potential adopters and of the seller of the innovation.
The relative advantage of producing (or of adopting) in a given period depends on the subsidies' changes over time. We show that some subsidy rates that increase in present value with time are equivalent to a fixed quantity tax in period 1 (and a fixed quantity subsidy in period 2).
The possibility of these adverse effects of subsidies is specially relevant for a government or public agency concerned with social welfare but uninformed about demand for the innovation and/or the new technology's production costs. Our results recommend caution when choosing adoption subsidies if such information is unavailable. Subsidies that increase in present value with time may have undesirable consequences. When lack of information is not a problem, i.e., when the public agency has complete information, we show that any level of social welfare, or any specific diffusion process, may be attained in a cheaper way by using fixed quantity subsidies rather than subsidy rates.
It is clear that if subsidies induce adoption levels that are above the efficient ones, then welfare may decrease as the benefit to the marginal adopter is lower than the cost of provision of the marginal unit of the innovation.
Our results show how, as a consequence of subsidies, welfare may also decrease if adoption levels remain below the efficient ones. This decrease in welfare is caused by induced reductions in the adoption levels corresponding to some or to all periods. In fact, when diffusion levels diminish in all periods we have not only lower welfare but also lower surplus of the innovation adopters. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the set of assumptions and studies the monopolist decisions with and without adoption subsidies. Section 3 analyzes the effects of these adoption subsidies. The last section discusses some extensions of the analysis to other market structures and summarizes briefly the results.
Monopolist decisions with and without adoption subsidies
Consider an innovation produced by a monopolist (an owner of a patent, for instance) and demanded by many price taking buyers in a two-period framework.
The analysis below will be developed under the following set of assumptions:
A.l.
Any unit of the innovation produced and adopted in period 1 may be used again in period 2, with no depreciation.
A.2. The monopolist and the buyers have the same discount factor u = l/( 1 + I), where I is the interest rate.
A.3. The seller and the buyers are completely informed about demand for the innovation and production costs.2
A.4. The seller cannot precommit to future sale prices; the buyers are rational and predict perfectly the producer's future decisions.
A.5.
There is a resale market in which the innovation bought during the first period can be resold to other adopters in the second period.3 A.6.
If ci represents the unit cost of producing the innovation in period i, it will be ci -vc2 2 c~.~ 2 Thus, there is no uncertainty and there are no information asymmetries between the seller and the buyers. Hence, epidemic learning is assumed away. See Mansfield (1968) Davies (1979) and Bhatt (1989) for analysis of epidemic learning and uncertainty. 3 However, as it is the case in reality, we will consider that when there are subsidies to promote innovation diffusion only new adoptions will be subsidized. 4The unit cost of production is assumed independent of the production level to simplify the analysis. However, it is not necessary for our results.
A.l, A.2 and A.3 simplify the analysis. A.4 implies that the monopolist cannot establish a credible commitment on future behaviour and incorporates rational expectations on the buyer's side as a methodological tool. A.5 assures that the different units of the innovation will be used in each period by those consumers that value it most.' Finally, A.6 permits us to guarantee that, in the context considered here, the efficient level of adoption does not decrease with time. 6 Observe that this latter assumption implies cr >cz.
Let us denote by h,(x) the inverse demand function for the services of the innovation in period i.7 Then, given prices p1 and p2, the adoption levels will be x1 for period 1 and x2 -x1 for period 2 such that'
i.e., such that the marginal adopter derives in each period a benefit equal to the additional price paid by adopting in that period.' We derive the monopolist decisions by backward induction to guarantee intertemporal consistency, a required equilibrium condition if buyers have rational expectations and the seller cannot precommit on future behaviour." Thus, the monopolist will solve in period 2 max(h2(x2)-c2)(x2 -x1) X2
5 An alternative would be to assume that the demand curves for the services of the innovation have perfect rank correlation or to admit that the innovation bought in period 1 may be sold to the monopolist in the future at the current future price. For an alternative rationing mechanism see Van Cayseele (1991) . A.5 implies, also, that there are no sunk costs when adopting the innovation. 6 The efficient levels of adoption are those adoption levels that maximize social welfare. If the efficient level of adoption may decrease with time, the results in the literature on the irreversibility effect are relevant. See Fisher et al. (1972) and Henry (1974) for initial results in the subject and Viscusi (1988) and Usategui (1990) for recent developments. ' Thus, it is assumed in this paper that the value of the innovation for an adopter is independent both of the number of innovation adopters and of the order of that adoption within each period's set of adoptions.
For analysis of situations where this assumption does not hold see Reinganum (1981a, b) , Quirmbach (1986), Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) and Ireland and Stoneman (1985) . s The consideration of buyers with rational expectations and A.5 imply that pr must be equated to the sum of the rental value of the innovation in period 1 and the discounted value of p2. 9 If a buyer decides not to adopt in period 1 he may adopt in period 2, but the only alternative to adoption in period 2 is not to adopt the innovation. lo The solution obtained by backward induction is the one that corresponds to profit maximization in the context considered.
and the solution will satisfy:"
Eq. (1) shows that the monopolist will choose the adoption (or production) level in period 2 which equates marginal revenue of residual demand in that period to the corresponding unit (or marginal) cost of production.12 From (1) we may derive x2 as a function of x1. Thus, to obtain the monopolist decision for period 1 we solve
Then xr will satisfy h,(x,) + h;(x,)x, +uh;(x2)x1~~ =c1--vc2.
(2)
Eq. (2) shows that the monopolist will choose in period 1 the adoption level which equates marginal revenue to the opportunity cost of producing in period 1 instead of in period 2. This marginal revenue takes into account the effect on the value of the innovation in period 2 as this value is incorporated in the demand for the (durable) innovation in period 1. Let us now consider that each adoption of the innovation in period i receives a fixed quantity subsidy si, with si30 and i= 1, 2.13 Then, given prices p1 and p2 the adoption levels will be x1 for period 1 and x2 -x1 for period 2 such that
i.e., in each period adoption proceeds until the marginal adopter's benefits equal the additional net price he has to pay to use the innovation in that I' In the case of the demand functions considered in the next section (that contains the main results), all second-order conditions for the maximization problems presented are satisfied. Thus, we do not care about making explicit here any second-order condition. l2 The monopolist is concerned with residual demand in period 2 because the innovation is a durable good. I3 We are assuming that the public agency can precommit to future subsidies. A public agency without commitment ability is much less tractable and requires the design of a decision procedure in the case of an uninformed public agency.
period. Therefore, the monopolist will solve sequentially the following problems:
and max (MxJ + s2 -c2)(x2 -xi) XZ max(Wr) +i@2(xz(x1)) +sr)xr X1
The monopolist will then choose those levels x2 and x1 which satisfy:
h,(x,)+h;(x,)x,+uh;(x,)x,~=C,-SI-"(c2-Sz).
1
If we compare conditions (3) and (4) with conditions (1) and (2) it is clear that the impact of fixed quantity subsidies on the diffusion process is analogous to the impact of a decrease in the unit cost of each period in the same amount as the subsidy established for that period.
If, instead, it is subsidized a percentage di (d,>O) of the price pi paid for the innovation in period i, the adoption levels x1 and x2 -x1 will satisfy
Then, solving sequentially the corresponding monopolist problems for periods 2 and 1 we obtain that x1 and x2-x1 will satisfy:
But Eq. (6) can be rewritten as dx Mx,)+h;(x,)x, + uh;(x,)x,
If we compare conditions (5) and (7) with conditions (3) and (4) we can see that the impact of d1 and d, on diffusion levels is analogous to the added (or total) impact of the following three subsidies: -a fixed quantity subsidy in period 2 in an amount equal to c,dz, _ a fixed quantity subsidy in period 1 in an amount equal to c,d,, and _ a subsidy in period 1 in an amount equal to a percentage u(d, -dJ of the difference p2 -c2.
If we denote these subsidies by sf, s$ and al: respectively, we can define
s"l =Cldl, It is important to note that price levels are higher under d, and d2 than under the corresponding sd,, s; and a; given by (8), (9) and (10). This result is proved in the appendix. Intuitively, what drives the result is the fact that an increase (decrease) in the sale price implies, with subsidy rates, an increase (decrease) in the amount of subsidy received per adopted unit. This is contrary to the case of fixed quantity subsidies, and, consequently, with subsidy rates price increases have a lower impact on the quantity demanded.
Analysis of the effects of adoption subsidies
In this section we discuss the consequences of adoption subsidies. To perform the analysis we consider the case of demand functions that are linear and identical in both periods. Thus h,(x,) =e-fxi for i= 1,2. We also consider that social welfare is measured as the present value of the sum of consumer surplus and the producer's surplus, net of subsidies cost.15 Thus, I4 As an example of a situation where s", + ad, <O consider that hAxi) = 300 -xi, i = 1,2; ct = 80, c,=30, v=O.5, d, =0.2 and d,=OS. Then, solving (5) and (6), and remembering that p$ =(h(x,))/(l -d2) we obtain p;= 219.4 and s", + C$ = -12.41.
I5
To simplify we consider that the social cost of public funds is 1. Therefore, we are assuming away any need to use distortive taxation to raise money to subsidize adoption.
we are assuming that distributional issues can be ignored and that the welfare gain achieved by eventual buyers of the goods produced using the innovation are negligible. Under these considerations, the adoption levels that maximize social welfare will be XT and x; that solve max y(e-_fx)dx-c,x,+v T(e-fx)dX-ac2(xZ-x1) (X1.X2) IJ 0 and, therefore, satisfy e-fx;=c,
and e-fx;=c,-UC,.
Clearly, when there are no subsidies, the adoption levels, given from (1) and (2) by e+fx,-2fxz=c, and e-2+: fxl=cl-vcZ, ( > 2 are lower than the efficient ones.
We will focus on the situation where subsidized adoption in each period is not greater than the efficient adoption in that period. This permits us to make neat comparisons on welfare, as social welfare may decrease when adoption levels are above the efficient ones. This would result as a consequence of the existence of adoptions by buyers that value the innovation less than its unit cost of production.
The first two results presented below refer to the effects of adoption subsidies. The context is such that the public agency, in spite of being concerned with social welfare, has no information about the demand for the innovation and/or production costs. To proceed, let x: and x; denote the solutions to conditions (3) and (4) (i.e., the adoption levels with fixed quantity subsidies) and let XT and xr denote the solutions to conditions (5) and (6) (i.e., the adoption levels with subsidy rates). Also, let W" (W*), ITo (Z7*) and CS" (CS*), stand for social welfare, monopolist profits and consumer surplus in the corresponding situations. If xi, x1, w n and CS denote the values of the variables when there are not adoption subsidies, we can prove first: Finally, to prove part (v) notice that CS=(f/2)(x:+vxj), CS"= (f/2)(xy2 + VX~~). Hence, CS" > CSOX",~ -xf + ~(~02~ -.x:) >O, and it is not difticult to show that the latter inequality occurs.
Q.E.D.
A possible situation derived from Proposition 1, therefore, is that no >17, CS" > CS and W" < W, if sr < vs2. This means that although fixed quantity subsidies may be in the interest of the seller and buyers, they can, simultaneously, diminish social welfare. The reason for this possible situation is that subsidies, in this model, constitute a cost for society that is borne neither by the seller nor by the buyers of the innovation.
What causes first period adoption to decrease when we are subsidizing adoption in that period? The answer is: a higher (in present value) subsidy in period 2. Some potential adopters of the innovation may prefer to delay adoption until period 2 to benefit from a higher subsidy in that period, even though that postponement implies that they will not use the innovation in I6 More details concerning the proofs are available upon request from the authors. period 1. Alternatively, and remembering that fixed quantity subsidies may be interpreted as reductions in unit costs of production, the monopolist may decide to transfer production from period 1 to period 2 in order to benefit from the higher cost reduction in this latter period. The result in Proposition 1 warns us against fixed quantity subsidies that increase, in present value, with time. Those subsidies may decrease social welfare and make adoption slower, even if adoption levels remain below the efficient ones. Choosing, instead, s1 and s2 such that s1 > us2 we will achieve a welfare improvement."
Observe, however, that if usz >s, then xi -xi > x2--x1,
i.e., adoption of the innovation in period 2 increases. This latter result is a consequence of the higher residual demand that the monopolist faces in period 2 as x: <x1 when us2 > sr.
Turning now to subsidy rates and making use of (8) (9) and (lo), it can be proved that: Proof. By noting that p; =(e -f xz)/( 1 -d2) it is not difficult to derive (i), (ii) and (iii) from (1) (2), (5) and (6). Besides, as CS* =(f/2)(x:'+vx$*) it is immediate to show that (v) is true. Also, it is easy to obtain (vi) from the expressions of LZ and IZ* and from the result that monopolist prices are higher under subsidy rates than under the equivalent fixed quantity subsidies.
Finally, with respect to (iv) notice that if sy +a", >vsd, it is clear that W* > W as in this case x7 >,x, and xl > x2. However, for the case s': + a': < us: an example of W* -W < 0 is the following: h,(x,)= 100-x, i= 1,2, " Remember that we are considering situations where subsidized adoption is below the efficient levels.
xi ' = 60.92 > 53.33 Proposition 2 is analogous to Proposition 1 when s': + a': >O. Thus, if s': + u': < usi social welfare may diminish even though monopolist profits and consumer surplus increase. To obtain sy + a! < usi it must be d, < d2 because d, 2 d, implies s': > s; and s': + a': > US;.
However, the potential undesirable consequences of subsidy rates are more important than those associated to fixed quantity subsidies that increase in present value with time. From (i) and (ii) in Proposition 2 it is clear that if st + ui < -&2-u/2) then adoption levels in both periods will diminish and, hence, consumer surplus and social welfare will decrease. As an example of this possibility consider: However, with d, cd, the impacts on welfare, consumer surplus and adoption levels may be negative. The monopolist's reaction to subsidy rates, i.e. the increase of sale prices, explains those effects. The monopolist may decide significant increases in price that raise the subsidy received by the innovation adopter and, hence, have a lower negative impact on the quantity demanded. In other words, the monopolist can be reluctant to increase production as that would imply a decrease in the sale price and, thus, in the amount of the subsidy, which would reduce the demand for the innovation.
From Proposition 2 it is clear that if adoption is reduced in period 1 there will be more new adoptions in period 2. This is a consequence of the higher residual demand that will result in that case.
The potential negative effects of adoption subsidies in Propositions 1 and 2 advise us to be careful when selecting those subsidies. We know that if adoption levels are placed above the efficient ones welfare may decrease even with fixed quantity subsidies that decrease in present value. But Propositions 1 and 2 show that welfare may also decrease if adoption levels remain below the efficient ones. And this decrease in welfare may result even if subsidies increase total (cumulated) adoption in period 2.
From Propositions 1 and 2 one might be tempted to infer that fixed quantity subsidies are more advisable than subsidy rates as the latter may reduce the final extent of diffusion and may diminish the surplus of the innovation adopters. However, it cannot be stated that any pair of fixed quantity subsidies is preferred to any pair of subsidy rates. Hence, a public agency with no complete information does not have a clear choice. Instead, we may prove the following result for a public agency with complete information about demand for the innovation and production costs:
Proposition 3. For a public agency with complete information it is cheaper to induce a given welfare level by using fixed quantity subsidies rather than subsidy rates.
Proof.
Consider that x7 and xt represent the adoption levels obtained with subsidy rates d, and d,. From (8) , (9) and (10) (xf) in period 1 and h2(x:) in period 2), the difference in monopolist's profits is just a consequence of the different costs of both policies for the public agency.'* Therefore, fixed quantity subsidies permit us to attain any given welfare level with a lower expenditure.
Q.E.D.
According to Proposition 3 a public agency with complete information concerned with social welfare will prefer fixed quantity subsidies to subsidy rates. If the budget disposable to promote adoption is big enough the agency will select the fixed quantity subsidies needed to attain adoption levels x7 and x; defined in (11) and (12). As the adoption level in period 1 without subsidies is lower than x;, the fixed quantity subsidies necessary to attain XT and x; will be decreasing in present value (Proposition l(i)). However, the budget may not s&ice to attain XT and x;; then, the public agency with complete information will choose those fixed quantity subsidies that maximize social welfare subject to the budget restriction.
Conclusion and extension to non-monopoly structures
In this paper we have analyzed the effects of subsidies for the adoption of innovations.
Assuming that: (i) the seller cannot precommit to future sale prices, (ii) buyers have rational expectations, (iii) the subsidies may change over time and (iv) adoption levels remain below the optimal ones, it has been shown that subsidies may reduce social welfare and, in the case of subsidization of a percentage of the sale price, they may even make diffusion slower (and smaller) and reduce the adopters surplus. These results are specially relevant for diffusion policies as governments have generally no complete information about demand for the innovation and/or production costs. Hence, they decide on subsidies without such information. We have also shown that, for a public agency with complete information, it is cheaper to induce a given welfare level by using fixed quantity subsidies rather than subsidy rates.
The analysis has been developed for the case of a monopolist supplier. But our results can be easily extended to the case of Cournot competition among the sellers of the new technology.
The possibility of adverse effects of subsidy rates diminishes, however, with the number of competitors (N) as the rise in competition increases adoption levels and reduces sale prices and, therefore, makes less possible that subsidies act like a tax in period 1.19 For instance, in our example of subsidy rates of Section 3, assuming that adoption levels with subsidies remain below the efficient ones, it can be shown that: When the number of sellers increases, subsidies (either in percentage or fixed quantity) may reduce welfare as a result of inducing adoption levels which are higher than the efficient ones. This occurs because, with a high number of sellers, the situation resembles that of perfect competition, where adoption levels are the efficient ones.
Appendix
If x1 and x2 represent the adoption levels attained with subsidy rates d, and d, and if pf and p$ are, respectively, the resulting prices in periods 1 and 2 with those subsidy rates, we can write Also, from the first-order condition in period 1, P': 'cl+ 4Pd,-C2).
I9 The equivalent subsidy in period 1 (4 +a$ increases with the decrease in the price in period 2, and thus with N, as it is clear from Eqs. (9) and (10).
